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courtesy. Hence, the vendee would have no occasion to see a tell-tale foreign
certificate, should one exist.
The foreign secured party fares better elsewhere than in a Code state
in this situation. In Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz," the same trio appear: an
innocent foreign mortgagee with an interest perfected in the state of origin,
a dealer who has wrongfully removed and wrongfully sold the automobile,
and an unsuspecting purchaser. The court held that the mortgagee should
prevail since he had taken all reasonable steps. In short, mere possession
by the dealer is not enough.2° The owner must be charged with some over-
sight or imprudence for the purchaser to prevail. Estoppel can operate only
against a party in whom there is some legal fault. Most courts have been
willing to cut off the security interest if, in addition to possession by the
dealer, other circumstances converge to justify the penalty, such as the leav-
ing of documents, indicia of ownership, in improper hands. The Code makes
short work of these distinctions: all interests created by the dealer are cut
off by a good faith purchase. 2 '
PAUL G. DELANEY
Corporations—Derivative Suits—Security for Expenses under Rule
X-10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission.—McClure v. Borne
Chemical Co.'—Plaintiffs, stockholders in Borne Chemical Co., brought a
10 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950). The case is cited with approval by the
court in the principal case, but with no comment upon the fact that resale was by a
dealer.
20 The mortgagee who has left encumbered goods with the mortgagor engaged in
the sale of such goods may well be deprived of his rights as against an innocent pur-
chaser on theories of agency, waiver, or estoppel. But the law chose not to make this an
absolute proposition. Possession alone is inconclusive. "The law takes into account not
simply the deception of the subsequent buyer by the appearance of title in the possessor
of the goods, but also whether this appearance of title was created by the original owner
for a purpose so essential and proper that the original title must be protected irrespective
of the injury to the subsequent buyer." 2 Williston, Sales § 312 (rev. ed. 1948).
Mod v. Chicago National Bank, 3 III. App.2d 49, 120 N.E.2d 567 (1954); Rand's
Discount Co, v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 10 App. Div.2d 240, 198 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1960).
The classic case of the watch left for repairs with a jeweler typifies this principle.
Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953). The rule is no
less applicable to automobile cases. Budget Plan inc. v. Savoy, 336 Mass. 322, 145
N.E.2d 710 (1957).
See also the Uniform Sales Act, 1 U.L.A. § 23(1); Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
2 U.L.A. § 9 (Supp. 1960) ; Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 9A U.L.A. § 9 (1951). These
laws all manifest particular concern for the innocent purchaser. Yet all accept the
premise that mere possession by the dealer is not enough. On the other hand, case
law has been said to have eroded the common law principle through a particular find-
ing of negligence by the mortgagee. First National Bank v. Hermann, 275 App. Div.
415, 90 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1949).
21 In
 a somewhat similar situation the Code again completely abrogates the old
principle. Section 2-403(2) states: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business."
The voidable title doctrine, as codified in § 2-403(1), has not yet been extended to
conditional sales. See, generally, 49 Ky. L.J. 437 (1961).
1 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
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derivative suit against Borne, a New Jersey corporation, and CEM Securities
Corp., a Delaware corporation, for allegedly unlawful dealings between the
two corporations. Plaintiffs stipulated in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that all allegations were restricted
to violations of Rule X-10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission passed
pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 2 The
defendants asked the court to require the plaintiffs to post security for
expenses, which request was denied. On appeal the defendants asserted
three grounds for reversal. First, that New Jersey and/or Pennsylvania
security for expenses statutes° were applicable; second, that defendants
were entitled to security under "general federal equity law"; and third,
that a security for expenses requirement should be implied from section
10(b) by analogy to other provisions of the law. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. HELD: In a shareholders' derivative suit brought in a federal
district court under Rule X-10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission,
security for expenses may not be required.
The court in its opinion, prior to the discussion of defendants' con-
tentions, gave a brief summary of the policy reasons behind security for
expenses requirements. The court felt that they are primarily intended to
prevent so-called "strike" suits. These are suits brought by minority stock-
holders for individual gain by way of secret settlement. Security for ex-
penses legislation reduces the number of derivative suits and does to some
extent eliminate the "strike" suit.
The court separately discussed and disposed of each of defendants'
claims. It had no difficulty holding the Pennsylvania statute non-applicable
as the law of the forum since jurisdiction was not predicated on diversity.
The court, however, had more difficulty with the New Jersey statute, ap-
parently bothered by the problem of whether state requirements for bringing
a derivative suit must be met in whatever court suit is brought if the cor-
poration is incorporated in New Jersey. In rejecting this argument the
court stressed the federal nature of the right sought to be enforced and
concluded that: "We think that the stockholders' right to maintain a de-
rivative action on a corporate right federal in nature is federally conferred." 4
This being so, state security for expenses requirements have no application.
Defendants' second contention was dismissed rather summarily. Unable
to find any "general federal equity law" supporting security for expenses,
the court characterized this contention as erroneous . 5
Finally, the court faced defendants' third, and what seemed to be
their most cogent argument. Defendants contended that if a private right
of action is to be implied either from the statute or from general principles
of tort law,° then a security for expenses requirement should be implied by
analogy to other sections of the statute. The court felt that there is no
clear general policy under the statute as some sections require security and
others do not. Therefore, where Congress is silent in a particular section
2 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78.j(b) (1958).
3 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14.3-15 (Supp. 1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 1322 (1953).
4 Supra note 1, at 832.
5 Supra note 1, at 835.
6 See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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such a requirement cannot be implied. The court did not discuss this argu-
ment in very great detail and it is not clear whether such a discussion might
not elicit a more definite congressional intent one way or the other
It would seem that in discussing federal "strike" suit prevention the
court should have discussed Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This rule prohibits the settlement of derivative suits without the permission
of the court, thereby apparently eliminating the cause of "strike" suits. The
decision of the court on these particular facts seems to be correct. However,
if the court were going to preface the decision with a policy discussion, it
might have given a more complete treatment by including a discussion of
Rule 23. If Rule 23 can be interpreted to prevent the "strike" suit, then
federal security for expenses requirements must be justified on other grounds
or they should be eliminated. Security for expenses legislation has had a
long and controversial history in both state and federal courts. Perhaps the
utilization of Rule 23 could satisfy both sides. It would, on the one hand,
prevent the "strike" suit and, on the other hand, would relieve the minority
shareholder of the security for expenses burden.
Of course, the elimination of security for expenses requirements from
federal laws is a legislative rather than a judicial function. However, if
Federal Rule 23 does eliminate the need for security for expenses perhaps
the courts could aid Congress by pointing this out. If in judicial discussion
of this problem the courts showed agreement on the impact of Rule 23 on
security for expenses requirements, then the legislature would be better
able to act. The courts cannot disregard existing laws but they can show
that certain provisions have become unnecessary due to subsequent enact-
ments thereby giving the legislature cause to reexamine their original
position.
JAMES M. QUINN
Fair Trade Laws—Non-Signer Clauses—Constitutionality.—Hudson
Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co.; Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly El Co. 1--
The plaintiff is the operator of retail stores which sell pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The defendants are the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals which they
distribute to retailers either directly or through wholesalers. The defendants
independently entered into a number of written contracts with retail stores in
Ohio for the purpose of determining the retail price of their commodities,
and served notice of these contracts on the plaintiff. The plaintiff purchased
the defendants' trade-marked products in interstate commerce from a third
party, with notice of the established retail price in Ohio. He then proceeded
to sell these articles at prices below those fixed by the defendants. The de-
fendants individually sought to enjoin the plaintiff from selling their products
for less than the established prices. In so doing, they claimed the protection
of the Ohio Fair Trade Act, which makes the purchase of a trade-marked or
trade named commodity for resale, with knowledge of the existence of fair
trade contract prices, an implied contract to comply with these prices, even
1 176 N.E.2d 236, Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) 70,065 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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